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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The United States District Court for the State of New Union
exercised federal question subject-matter jurisdiction' over the
consolidated cases by the Plaintiffs against the Power Companies
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit
has subject matter jurisdiction over both final orders of the Dis-
trict Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The matter comes before this court pursuant to the issuance
of a final order by the District Court in the granting of both mo-
tions for summary judgment filed by the EPA and the Power Com-
panies in their entirety.2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. After Illinois v. City of Milwaukee does there remain a fed-
eral common law of nuisance that could be applied to carbon diox-
ide emissions from power plants in New Union?
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
2007]
3
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
2. If a public nuisance exists related to CO 2 under either fed-
eral or state law, is it appropriate to apply the Landers v. East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. rule on indivisible harm to the cir-
cumstances in this case?
3. Should the precautionary principle, a principle of custom-
ary international law, be a consideration in balancing benefits
versus harm in a nuisance analysis?
4. Is the harm to plaintiffs Province of Inuksuk and Village of
Akuli sufficiently concrete to provide standing to bring the nui-
sance action?
5. Is U.S. EPA required by section 115 of the Clean Air Act to
notify the Governor of New Union that the State must amend its
State Implementation Plan to reduce emissions from the defen-
dant power plants to a level consistent with emissions that can be
achieved using the currently available control technology?
6. Is the United States government, acting through the EPA,
required under the Trail Smelter doctrine to reduce C0 2 emissions
to levels that can be achieved through the application of currently
available control technology so as to minimize harm to a neighbor-
ing country?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case pertains to two consolidated actions by the Plain-
tiffs-Appellants against five defendant power companies on nui-
sance and international law claims and a citizen's suit against the
U.S. EPA on Clean Air Act ("Act") and international law claims.3
This appeal is from the final order of the United States District
Court for the State of New Union issued on June 12, 2006, grant-
ing the motions for summary judgment filed by the EPA and the
Power Companies. 4
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Province of Inuksuk and the Village of Akuli are plain-
tiffs in this consolidated action concerning the impact of climate
change on their area's ice cover which they use for harvesting and
travel.5 The Province/Village filed a citizen suit against the EPA
under section 115 of the Clean Air Act ("Act") and the Trail
3. Record at 1.
4. Record at 4, 12.
5. Record at 4-5.
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Smelter doctrine in international law.6 They also filed a civil suit
against five power companies located in the State of New Union
on federal common law nuisance, public nuisance law, and inter-
national law claims seeking monetary damages in the amount of
$260 million and an injunction requiring the plants to reduce the
CO 2 emissions by 50 percent, the level currently achievable
through technology. 7
Two duly constituted international agencies have released
general reports concerning climate change affecting the area at
issue.8 The International Climate Change Research Panel ("IC-
CRP") issued the Artic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004
researched by scientists and finding that the Artic Region has
seen the fastest rate of climate change over the last few decades. 9
The Inuit Commission released the Inuksuk Study that noted
thawing of permafrost, loss of sea ice, and rising temperatures. It
predicted flooding may affect the Village of Akuli within three
years. 10
The Village voted in summer, 2005, to relocate the entire vil-
lage inland at a cost of approximately $260 million." The Village
is comprised of the Inuit, the people native to Inuktitut.12 Akuli is
located within the newly formed Canadian Province of Inuksuk.
The Province has about 11,000 residents across approximately
300,000 square miles and is bordered by the Hudson Bay and the
Hudson Strait.'3 Two Akuli residents referenced in the record in-
clude Sheila Weyiouna, who owns a general supplies store near
the water, and John Kiyutelluk, a full-time fisherman who owns a
home and wharf. 14 Mr. Kiyutelluk's wharf may have to be relo-
cated about 20 kilometers away and may be shut down during the
relocation. 15
The record is completely silent on the details of the power
plants, other than their company names: Genergy Corp., Atomic
Energy, Inc., Centennial Power Co., Power Suppliers Co., and
6. Record at 1-2.
7. Record at 1.
8. Record at 5-6.
9. Record at 6.
10. Record at 5.
11. Record at 5.
12. Id.
13. Record at 4-5.
14. Record at 6.
15. Id.
2007] 539
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First Energy, Ltd.16 No operating information is provided, such
as the amount or type of emissions by each company, the type of
technology used by each company, and so forth.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal of the consolidated claims
herein is de novo regarding whether the District Court properly
concluded based upon the record that no genuine dispute of mate-
rial facts existed when viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, 17 i.e., the Plaintiffs. This standard applies
throughout all arguments raised since all issues are on appeal
pursuant to the granting of the motions for summary judgment
filed by both the EPA and the Power Companies in their
entirety.18
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Inuksuk and Akuli have not demonstrated an injury in fact to
trigger standing in a federal court. Their shortcomings in this
arena lie with the speculative nature of their alleged harm.
The EPA has no obligation to issue an endangerment finding
under section 115 of the Act, nor could it issue such a finding sua
sponte or without a concurrent reciprocity finding. In this case,
the EPA permissibly declined to issue either finding as it received
no request from the Secretary of State to make a finding and the
international reports it received appeared to merely document
change in climate conditions in the Province. Neither report re-
quested specific relief from the EPA regarding these defendant
power companies, nor did the reports establish a causal link be-
tween these companies and the noted climate change.
The United States government, through the EPA, is not af-
fected by the Trail Smelter case since it is non-binding customary
international law and does not delineate a requirement of the gov-
ernment to reduce CO2 emissions through currently available con-
trol technology.
The Clean Air Act and its subsequent amendments fully pre-
empted the preexisting federal common law of nuisance. One of
the brightest indicators of this preemption was the clear congres-
sional intent as evidenced in the legislative history. Furthermore,
16. Record at 4.
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1987).
18. Record at 12.
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the comprehensive nature of the Act and the scientifically complex
issues it addresses are more appropriately decided by an elected
body of legislators than a judiciary.
The Landers rule could be appropriately applied in the in-
stant case if this court were to find that a public nuisance exists
under either federal or state law. The indivisible nature of the
plaintiffs alleged harm requires the application of this rule, other-
wise the plaintiffs could potentially lose all avenues of recovery for
their injury.
The precautionary principle is inapplicable to this case be-
cause there is no federal common law nuisance analysis. Even if
there were, the principle would at most be a non-binding evidence
of customary international law that U.S. courts are not required
to consider in rendering decisions.
ARGUMENT
I. THE HARM ALLEGED BY THE PETITIONERS IS
TOO SPECULATIVE TO PROVIDE STANDING
TO BRING THE NUISANCE ACTION
The Petitioners cannot satisfy the requirements to establish
standing in federal court. The requirement of standing is firmly
rooted in Article III of the Constitution of the United States which
confers power upon the courts to hear only actual "cases or contro-
versies." 19 From this general doctrine, American courts have ex-
trapolated various tests to deal with the issue. In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife20 the Supreme Court articulated a clear
three-part test that courts are to use when determining whether a
litigant has standing.21 "The party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing these elements."22 The plaintiff
must show that it suffered an "injury in fact".23 The plaintiff must
also establish causation between the contested conduct and the
injury. 24Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury
will be "redressed by a favorable decision. '25 As stated in Lujan,
to overcome a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff "must set
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
20. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992).
21. Id. at 560.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
2007]
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forth by affidavit or other evidence of specific facts for which pur-
poses of the summary judgment motion will be taken as true."26
When agency action is at issue, Congress has provided statu-
tory standing through the Administrative Procedure Act.27 How-
ever, the Supreme Court declared that a plaintiff challenging
government action must still establish that they have suffered an
"injury in fact."28 This honorable court has highlighted the issue
of whether Inuksuk and Akuli have suffered a "concrete" injury.
While this respondent would argue that the plaintiffs not only fail
to establish a "concrete" injury but also to sufficiently demonstrate
that that their alleged harm will be redressed by a favorable court
decision, we will restrict our discussion in deference to the court's
direction. In light of plaintiffs' failure to establish anything but a
speculative harm, the court below properly granted the defend-
ants' summary judgment motion.
A. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the injury
they anticipate is actual or imminent.
This respondent will make no attempt to trivialize the gravity
of the plaintiffs' situation. However, "standing is not measured by
the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advo-
cacy."29 The constitutional requirement of standing is an indis-
pensable hurdle to be leapt by any party wishing to utilize a court
of the United States.30 The EPA acknowledges the fact that for
the purpose of a summary judgment motion, the evidence put
forth by the plaintiffs should be given credibility. 31 However, even
affording their theories this added credence, the plaintiffs have
not suffered an "injury in fact" as required by law.
The Lujan court defined an "injury in fact" as follows. The
plaintiff must demonstrate that they suffered an "invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."32 Ad-
ditionally, they must do this using affidavits or other specific
26. Id. at 561.
27. 5 U.S.C. 702 (1976).
28. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970).
29. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982).
30. Id. at 475-76.
31. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
32. Id. at 560.
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facts.33 The plaintiffs in Lujan filed an action based on the En-
dangered Species Act. They claimed the Secretary of the Interior
failed to consult with other agencies in regard to overseas activity.
This, they asserted, led to the extinction of endangered and
threatened species and interfered with their right to enjoy the ani-
mals at some indeterminate time in the future.3 4 Because the
plaintiffs claimed that they would suffer an injury "some day", the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs alleged harm was not "ac-
tual or imminent" as required by the doctrine. 35
Contrast Lujan with the case of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.36 The plaintiffs in
Friends of the Earth alleged that the violation of mercury dis-
charge limits prevented them from enjoying the recreational area
in and around the North Tyger River.37 In an opinion authored by
Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court granted standing to the
plaintiffs stating that because members of the plaintiffs' class
could smell and see the pollutants accumulating in the river.
This, the court stated, was more than "general averments and con-
clusory allegations."38
Inuksuk and Akuli claim that they must move the village in-
land.39 Their decision to move the village is based on a hypotheti-
cal projection that atmospheric warming will cause flooding and
increased susceptibility to waves, storm surges and erosion. 40
These projections are conjectural in nature. Unlike the situation
in Laidlaw where the pollutants in the river had an immediate
impact on the day to day lives of the plaintiff, the Appellants filed
this suit based on something that might (or might not) happen in
the future. The fact that the Village voted to begin making prepa-
rations to move inland now has no bearing on whether the alleged
injury is imminent. While the EPA has conceded that a decrease
in ice cover is likely a result of global warming, it does not concede
that the Appellants are justified in taking such drastic measures.
Much like the plaintiffs in Lujan, they base their claim on an as-
33. Id. at 561.
34. Id. at 562.
35. Id. at 564.
36. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. 528
U.S. 167 (2000).
37. Id. at 181-82.
38. Id. at 184. (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 497 U.S. 871, 888
(1990)).
39. Record at 5.
40. Id.
20071 543
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sertion that some day in the future their fears may become a real-
ity. They are acting on the assumption that an assembly of
environmental factors will coalesce to make their doomsday pre-
dictions a reality. Such an inference cannot withstand the scru-
tiny of Article III standing.
II. THE EPA HAS NO MANDATORY DUTY TO MAKE
AN ENDANGERMENT FINDING UNDER
SECTION 115 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT.
The EPA is not obligated to issue an endangerment finding as
permitted under section 115 of the Act because it has discretion in
the "reasonably may be anticipated" test regarding the endanger-
ment. Nor did the EPA abuse its discretion in deciding against
issuing the finding because it made a reasoned decision that took
account of scientific facts and policy considerations involved in the
climate change patterns in the Province of Inuksuk. Regardless of
whether the EPA permissibly determined it did not have reason to
believe an endangerment exists, the EPA is barred from making
an endangerment finding in the absence of a reciprocity finding.
A. Section 115 of the Clean Air Act Provides the EPA
with Discretion Regarding Endangerment Findings.
The Act contains a provision permitting the EPA to regulate
air pollutants that it deems have a negative impact on an interna-
tional scale. It imposes three requirements prior to the EPA being
permitted to issue an endangerment finding: (1) information
about the pollution from an international agency; (2) a reasonable
belief in the pollution being the cause of the endangerment; and,
(3) reciprocity between the nations.41 The issuance of an endan-
germent finding by the EPA triggers the State Implementation
Plan ("SIP") revision procedure requested of the state receiving
the notice to the extent it can "prevent or eliminate the
endangerment."42
As section 115 of the Act states, if the EPA Administrator:
has reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emit-
ted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare in a foreign country or whenever the Secretary of
State requests him to do so .. .the Administrator shall give
41. Clean Air Act § 115(a), 42 U.S.C. 7415(a) (1982).
42. 42 U.S.C. 7415(b).
[Vol. 24544
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formal notification thereof to the Governor of the State in which
the emissions originate. 43
Such belief in an endangerment may only be made "upon re-
ceipt of reports, surveys or studies from any duly constituted in-
ternational agency."44  The third requirement regarding
reciprocity between the nations holds that an endangerment find-
ing may only be made concerning "a foreign country which the Ad-
ministrator determines has given the United States essentially
the same rights with respect to the prevention or control of air
pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by...
this Act.45
The EPA's interpretation of the section 115 requirements
must be examined to see whether: (1) where the Congressional in-
tent is "clear," the agency gave "effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress;" and, (2) if the intent is not
unambiguous, "whether the agency's answer is based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute."46 Here, the legislative history of
the 1977 amendments to the Act show that Congress intended sec-
tion 115 to "reflect the test of 'reasonably may be anticipated' to
endanger public health" and require that such test will only be
applied upon "a request by a duly constituted international agency
as a condition for the Administrator to act."47
With respect to the requirement of a request by international
agency for the EPA to act, here, appellants point to two interna-
tional studies on the condition of the Village of Akuli and the Artic
region. However, the Inuit Commission's Inuksuk Study merely
explains the current status of the environmental conditions of the
sea ice and permafrost and predicted potential impacts on Akuli.
It did not state what the cause of the changes in those conditions
may be, beyond changes in precipitation and temperature. Nor
did it ask the EPA to take any action, much less specifically regu-
late the emissions from the defendant power plants. 48 Likewise,
the Artic Climate Impact Assessment comments on the climate
change in the Artic region and does not pinpoint the cause of the
43. 42 U.S.C. 7415(a).
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. 7415(c).
46. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
47. H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-564, at 1517 (1977).
48. Record at 5-6.
20071 545
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climate change or request action by any agency, much less the
EPA. 49
This issue originally commenced when the Province of Inuk-
suk petitioned the EPA to regulate the CO 2 emissions emitted by
the defendant power plants. 50 It did not result from a request by
either an international agency as expected by the Congress or by
any request from the Governor of the State involved as expressly
allowed for in the Act.
Even had one of these requirements been met, the EPA still
had discretion under the "reasonably may be anticipated" test to
decide not to issue a finding. Though under the Chevron test the
Act does not expressly define "reasonably may be anticipated," the
EPA did permissibly interpret the discretionary power it has over
endangerment findings. The Chevron court held that if the
agency's interpretation reflects "a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by
the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
that Congress would have sanctioned."51
The EPA's decision here reflects a reasonable consideration of
the factors involved in issuing an endangerment finding. As the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated, the EPA does
not have a an obligation to issue a finding since "the words 'when-
ever' the Administrator 'has reason to believe' imply a degree of
discretion underlying the endangerment finding."5 2 But since a
finding then does raise an obligation on the part of the EPA to
notify the Governor of the State because the Act states the EPA
"shall" send notice,5 3 there is a "specific [statutory] linkage be-
tween the endangerment finding and the remedial procedures."54
The court agreed that a "unitary proceeding"55 regarding issu-
ing an endangerment finding and then sending notice to the State
does reflect the statutory linkage between these two processes: "if
there is insufficient information to enable the Administrator to
implement those remedies, the promulgation of an endangerment
49. Id. at 6.
50. Record at 7.
51. 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83,
(1961)).
52. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, 912 F.2d 1525, 1533 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
53. 42 U.S.C. 7415(b).
54. 912 F.2d at 1533.
55. 912 F.2d at 1534.
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finding alone would largely be pointless."56 This linkage then, in
the court's view, evidences that "the EPA's view that the Adminis-
trator must have sufficient evidence correlating the endanger-
ment to sources of pollution within a particular State before he
can exercise his discretion to make endangerment findings is both
reasonable and consistent with the statute."5 7 As then Appellate
Judge Scalia noted in a similar case involving section 115: "In the
context of a complex, multi-source pollution problem like acid dep-
osition [i.e., acid rain], identification of the problem does not nec-
essarily bring with it identification of the blameworthy states."5 8
In the case at bar, the EPA does not object to the findings of
the international reports that the changing ice cover in the Prov-
ince is due to atmospheric warning; however, the EPA has re-
ceived no information confirming that those changes are
specifically due to CO2 , much less from emissions from these five
defendant power plants.59 Without knowing which specific
source(s) are the cause of the pollution contributing to the loss of
ice cover, the EPA cannot know with any certainty which states it
would be required under the Act to send notice to about an endan-
germent finding. This would result in an endangerment finding
without effect.60
With respect to the reciprocity finding, the record is silent as
to whether or not the EPA reached such a determination. The On-
tario decision emanated from letters from then EPA Administra-
tor Douglas M. Costle to Senators Muskie and Mitchell stating in
part that "Canadian legislation regarding transboundary air pol-
lution" does provide the United States with "essentially the same
rights" as under the Act. The court determined the letters consti-
tuted final rules, but could not be given force and effect since they
had not undergone the notice and public comment process. Re-
gardless of their status, the letters also stated that "whether Ca-
nada in fact exercises or interprets that authority in a manner
that provides essentially the same rights to the U.S. is a 'dynamic'
determination 'which will continue to be influenced by Canadian
action now and in the future."'
This court is unable at this time to decide on whether the EPA
erred in not issuing an endangerment finding since it did not ar-
56. Id. at 1533.
57. Id.
58. Thomas v. State, 802 F.2 1443, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
59. Record at 7-8.
60. 912 F.2d at 1534.
2007] 547
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ticulate a reciprocity finding. Without the latter finding, this
court cannot fully determine whether the EPA could have permis-
sibly issued an endangerment finding. As a result, this court
should affirm the decision of the District Court that the EPA per-
missibly exercised its discretion that an endangerment finding is
not appropriate in this case, or in the alternative, remand with
instructions to clarify the record to determine whether a reciproc-
ity finding exists.
B. The EPA Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Determining that an Endangerment Finding Would
Be Inappropriate.
Judicial review of agency actions will result in the "set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."61 An agency's refusal to institute rulemaking proceed-
ings shall be overturned "'only in the rarest and most compelling
of circumstances"' 62 when there have been "'plain errors of law,
suggesting that the agency has been blind to the source of its dele-
gated power'."63 This is viewed as to whether the agency made a
"reasoned" decision. 64
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the court looked at an analogous
provision of the Act in relation whether to regulate CO2 from mo-
tor vehicles to help alleviate climate change wherein the EPA
could make a "threshold 'judgment' about whether to regu-
late... [gave] the Administrator considerable discretion."65 The
court further held that Congress does not limit the EPA to consid-
eration of scientific evidence in reaching decisions about whether
to regulate, but can also look to "policy judgments."66 The court
held that "a reviewing court 'will uphold agency conclusions based
on policy judgments' 'when an agency must resolve issues on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge."' 67
61. 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(9)(a); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
62. American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Lying, 812 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
(quoting WWHT, Inc. v. F.C.C., 656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
63. 812 F.2d at 5 (quoting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. De-
partment of Transportation, 680 F.2d 206, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
64. 812 F.2d at 5 (quoting Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)).
65. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57-58, (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 20 (D.C.Cir.1976)).
66. Id. at 58 (quoting 541 F.2d at 26).
67. 415 F.3d at 58 (quoting Envtl. Def Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82
(D.C.Cir. 1978)).
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In the present case, the plaintiffs seek the reviewing court to
require the EPA to issue a finding relating to climate change, a
complex scientific phenomenon. The traditional practice of courts
affording administrative agencies deference in their decision mak-
ing, as demonstrated by the Massachusetts case, should be applied
here as well. Through its expertise, the EPA is in the better posi-
tion to know whether the purpose of section 115 of the Act can be
effectuated by issuing a finding.
The EPA did not abuse its discretion because the EPA has
determined that there is "considerable uncertainty as to the
causal relationship between greenhouse gas emissions from U.S.
power plants and atmospheric warming in Inuksuk, Canada."6 8
Here the court did not avoid the Congressional intent in that there
are multiple purposes in the statute that sometimes may conflict
with one another. While the EPA does not have an obligation per
the statutory language to issue an endangerment finding, an obli-
gation to notify the State(s) affected does become an express
mandatory duty upon the EPA which it cannot carry out with cer-
tainty in this case.
This court should affirm the District Court ruling that the
EPA did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue an endanger-
ment finding against the defendant power plants since the reme-
dial process of requiring an SIP provision cannot be implemented
based on the frustrated situation of ascertaining which states are
responsible for the sources of endangerment.
III. THE TRAIL SMELTER DOCTRINE DOES NOT
BIND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO REDUCE CO EMISSIONS BECAUSE
INTERNATIONAL LAW IS INAPPLICABLE
IN DECIDING U.S. CASE LAW.
The issue of whether the United States government, through
the EPA, must reduce CO2 emissions through the application of
currently available control technology is a non-justiciable political
question which this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
grant such remedy. In the alternative, if the Trail Smelter doc-
trine is applied to the case it would have no binding effect since
customary international law does not bind U.S. courts. If the
court views Trail Smelter persuasively, it would still fail to meet
the clear and convincing evidence burden since there has been no
68. Record at 11.
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proof offered connecting these five defendant power companies as
the source of the pollution causing the climate change in the Prov-
ince. Further, Trail Smelter did not require the government to
impose certain regulations to curb the pollution.
A. The Issue is a Non-Justiciable Political Question.
The remedy sought by the Appellants requiring the defendant
power companies to reduce their CO2 emissions "to help prevent
future damages to other coastal villages" is "transcendently legis-
lative [in] nature" and therefore a non-justiciable political ques-
tion.69 In a similar case involving suit against power companies
for the "'public nuisance' for 'global warming'," the court affirmed
that "cases presenting political questions are consigned to the po-
litical branches that are accountable to the People, not to the Judi-
ciary, and the Judiciary is without power to resolve them."70
The court looked to the fact that: "Congress has recognized
that carbon dioxide emissions cause global warming and that
global warming will have severe adverse impacts in the United
States, but it has declined to impose any formal limits on such
emissions."71 It further examined the Chevron decision that held
air pollution cases require the court "to strike a balance 'between
interests seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to
eliminate its social costs and interests advancing the economic
concern that strict schemes [will] retard industrial development
with attendant social costs."' 72
The court also referenced how the topic of global warming has
been discussed at the last three Presidential debates and contin-
ues to be a topic frequently debated in Congress and on an inter-
national scale. 73 The holding that this issue, since consensus is
still not present in the United States or within the international
community, presents a non-justiciable political question pointed to
how many areas of law a decision on this topic could affect and,
thus, "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-ju-
dicial discretion" is required."74
69. Record at 11.
70. Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F.Supp. 2d 265, 267
(S.D.N.Y.2005).
71. Id. at 268-269 (citing The Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, P.L. 100-204,
Title XI, §§ 1102-03, reprinted at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note).
72. 406 F.Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting 467 U.S. at 847).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 274 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
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Here, since the same issue of global warming is raised with
respect to the ice cover in the Province's area, the same non-justi-
ciable political question is raised and should be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. International Law is Not Binding on U.S. Courts.
In the alternative, the Trail Smelter doctrine still would not
affect the outcome of this case even if the court considered it.
There are only three main sources of international law: (1) inter-
national agreements, including treaties, and bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements; (2) customary international law seen as a
"general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation; and, (3) general principles of interna-
tional law "common to the major legal systems."75 Customary in-
ternational law generally is non-binding on U.S. courts because it
does not "have the quality of the law... in that they do not regu-
late activities, relations, or interests in the United States. 76
The Inuit people of Alaska and northern Canada, for example,
filed a petition in December, 2005, with the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights to try the issue of the refusal of the
United States to engage in efforts to combat global warming. The
Tuvalu government of the island nation also plans to raise a simi-
lar claim at the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") against the
United States and Australia; however, since nation States must
voluntarily submit to the ICJ jurisdiction, the case may never ma-
terialize. Even if the ICJ issues an advisory opinion, it would
again be non-binding.77 Given that an international arbitration
tribunal decided the Trail Smelter case, it is evidence of custom-
ary international law which has no per se binding effect on any
nation's courts. At most, the Trail Smelter case, if consistent with
already existing U.S. law, may be viewed by the court as persua-
sive authority.
75. Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations § 102 (1987).
76. Id. at § 111 cmt. (c); cf. Linda A. Malone, Environmental Regulation of Land
Use at the International Level, in 1 Envtl. Reg. of Land Use § 1:4 (2006), stating that
"binding standards have been limited to addressing environmental problems on a
case-by-case basis.").
77. Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change Policies An Ocean Apart: E. U. and U.S.
Climate Change Policies Compared, 14 Penn. St. Envtl. L. Rev. 435, 456 (2006).
2007]
17
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
C. Trail Smelter Does Not Obligate the United States
Government to Cap CO 2 Emissions.
Assuming arguendo that U.S. courts could decide this issue
on the basis of international law, the landmark case for applying
customary international law to cases involving transboundary
harm between two or more foreign nations is the Arbitral Tribu-
nal case of US v. Canada, commonly referred to as the Trail
Smelter case.78 An international tribunal held the Canadian gov-
ernment liable to damage caused to agriculture and timberland in
the State of Washington from the release of sulphur dioxide fumes
emitted down the Columbia River valley from a copper smelter in
British Columbia. 79 The tribunal held that:
[un]der the principles of international law [.. . no state has the
right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or of the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious conse-
quences and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.80
The case ultimately held Canada financially liable for the
damage caused to the area in the United States and required the
smelter to halt operations to the extent they continue to cause
damage 8
This holding requires a showing of material damage, not mere
passage of pollution across another sovereign's border. The gen-
eral standard that no nation shall permit transboundary environ-
mental harm of another nation, also referred to as sic utero tuo,
later became codified in the non-binding Principle 21 of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm,
commonly referred to as the Stockholm Declarations.8 2
78. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (U.S. v. Can.), Arbitral Tribunal, 3 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 1905 (1949), reprinted in 35 AM J. Int'l L. 684 (1941).
79. Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Dgjd Vu: Extraterritoriality, International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary
Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 363, 420 (2005).
80. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Weaving the Rules For Our Common Future:
Principles, Practices and Prospects for International Sustainable Development Law,
(Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2002), p. 38 (quoting Trail
Smelter 35 Am J. Int'l L. at 699).
81. 1 Envtl. Reg. of Land Use § 1:4.
82. Erik K. Moller, The United States-Canadian Acid Rain Crisis: Proposal for an
International Agreement, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 1207, 1228 (1989) (citing Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1 U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf., 48/14 (1972)).
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Since the Trail Smelter case, however, is an international
case, it has no binding effect on the U.S. courts. Even if it were
binding law, though, the case did not specify how the cause of the
pollution should be controlled despite the harm being material
since the economy of the Village of Akuli depends upon harvesting
the land and ice that is being affected by the climate change.8 3
This material harm would have to be demonstrated at the inter-
mediate level of burden of proof, i.e., clear and convincing evi-
dence.8 4 Trail Smelter, however, restrained the source of the
pollution, the smelter, from continuing to allow the pollution to
occur. If Trail Smelter were applied to this case, it still would not
necessarily follow that the EPA would be required to intervene by
implementing regulations that would reduce CO2 emissions
through the application of currently available control technology.
Accordingly, the District Court should be affirmed in its decision
denying the Appellants recovery under the Trail Smelter doctrine.
IV. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS
PREEMTED THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF
NUISANCE AS INTENDED BY CONGRESS
Prior to the enactment of the Clean Air Act, this court may
have decided a case such as this using the federal common law of
nuisance. However, the Supreme Court of the United States dis-
tinctly stated in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan that
when Congress acts to fill an area previously occupied by the com-
mon law, the common law is displaced.8 5 City of Milwaukee v. Illi-
nois and Michigan arose due the discharge of sewage into Lake
Michigan by sewage treatment plants on the Wisconsin shore of
the lake. The court originally heard the case prior to the Congres-
sional enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter the "Clean Water Act"). At that
time, the court held that a federal common law of nuisance did
exist and may be applicable to the issue at hand.8 6 However, the
court recognized that "new federal laws and new federal regula-
tions may in time preempt the field of federal common law of nui-
sance.8 7 The Supreme Court revisited the issue several years
later, after the passage of the 1972 amendments and held that
83. Record at 5.
84. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1306 (2006).
85. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981).
86. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
87. Id. at 107.
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such a preemption had in fact occurred. The court relied on sev-
eral factors in coming to this decision. Namely, the court stated
that Congress intended the Clean Water Act to be an "all-encom-
passing program of water pollution regulation."8 8 Furthermore,
the court noted that the complexity of the water pollution control
is more appropriately dealt with by Congress than the courts.8 9
Though City of Milwaukee dealt with the Clean Water Act, the
principles developed in that case are directly analogous to the ap-
plication of the Clean Air Act in the instant case.90
A. Congress eliminated the Federal Common Law of
nuisance by enacting a measure as comprehensive
as the Clean Air Act.
In determining whether statutory or common law applies to a
federal issue, the Rhenquist court emphatically stated that, "we
start with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal
courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a
matter of federal law."9 1 The court acknowledges that clear con-
gressional intent is necessary for a judicial body to hold that fed-
eral law preempts state common law.9 2 This premise is based in
the Constitution's protection of states' rights and the fact that the
states are not represented in the federal courts as they are in Con-
gress. However, this proposition actually strengthens the argu-
ment that congressional action (federal law) should "displace"
federal common law. After all, the states enjoy considerable vot-
ing influence in Congress and none in the federal courts.
The Rhenquist court utilized several factors in their decision.
Specifically, they mentioned Congress' intent "to establish an all-
encompassing program of water pollution regulation."93 They also
noted that the purpose of the Amendments was "to establish a
comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pol-
lution."94 Finally, the court made mention of the fact that the
comprehensive nature of the legislation leaves no room for the
court to apply any federal common law.9 5 The same factors, when
88. City of Milwaukee at 318.
89. Id. at 325.
90. Record at 8.
91. City of Milwaukee at 317.
92. Id. at 317 n.9.
93. Id. at 318.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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applied to the case hand, indicate that similar treatment should
be given by this court to the Clean Air Act.
To first ascertain Congressional intent with regard to the
Clean Air Act we look to the text of the legislation itself. Section
101 states that the purposes of the Act are to "protect and en-
hance the quality of the Nation's air resources", to "initiate and
accelerate a national research and development program to
achieve the prevention and control of air pollution," and to "en-
courage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local
governmental actions, consistent with the provisions of this Act,
for pollution prevention."96 This broad and sweeping mandate for
the legislation demonstrates Congress' intent to fill the space pre-
viously occupied by the common law.
Courts also should employ the legislative history as a tool for
deciphering the meaning and implications of legislation. If any
doubt remains as to the meaning of the statute, that doubt is re-
moved by the legislative history.97 The legislative history sur-
rounding the Clean Air Act shows clear Congressional intent to
displace any preexisting Federal Common Law. During the Sen-
ate debates in 1990, Al Gore expressed his congratulations to the
Congress on their completed work and stated, "It is a comprehen-
sive bill addressing many of the threats now confronting our envi-
ronment."98 This is but one example of the members of Congress
demonstrating their belief that they were indeed passing compre-
hensive legislation. "The bill we are offering for your approval is
the most comprehensive clean air bill-and the most comprehen-
sive environmental bill-ever written."99 If there were any doubt
that the previous Amendments to the Clean Air Act had been suf-
ficiently comprehensive to displace the federal common law, Rep-
resentative John David Dingell summarily dispensed it.
Representative Dingell, who had participated in the writing of
every clean air bill ever passed stated, "None of those previous
measures remotely approaches the complexity or comprehensive-
ness of the bill we are considering today... With this legislation,
we are addressing the full range of air. quality issues."100 If the
City of Milwaukee court held that the Clean Water Act was a com-
prehensive measure, how could any court deem the Clean Air Act
96. Clean Air Act § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. 7401(a) (1990).
97. Bankamerica Corp. v. U.S. 462 U.S. 122, 123 (1983).
98. 136 Cong. Rec. S592-02 (1990).
99. 136 Cong. Rec. H2511-02 (1990).
100. 136 Cong. Rec. H12845-03 (1990).
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to be any less comprehensive in light of this illustrative legislative
history?
The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments contains fur-
ther evidence that Congress intended to eliminate the federal
common law. A search of the history reveals that all references to
any element of federal common law which may survive the
Amendments are made with disdain. One member of the Con-
gress, expressing his opposition to several proposed Amendments,
stated, "In fact, these provisions may be a thinly veiled effort to
institute federal common law. Thus, they would raise new
problems without opportunity for clear technical or administrative
solutions. I oppose these provisions stringently!"101 Senator Allen
Simpson referred to a proposed Amendment to Section 121 as "our
old and tired friend the 'Federal Common Law of Nuisance' in but
a new guise. It would broaden the current Interstate pollution pro-
visions of the Act to such an extent that the Federal judiciary
would be given an open-ended mandate to create an entirely new
overlay of regulatory requirements .. .. *"102 His criticism of this
proposed Amendment is particularly relevant because he dis-
cusses a hypothetical situation in which a citizen of Canada might
seek injunctive relief in a United States Federal Court for adverse
environmental effects allegedly caused by an American company.
The proposed Amendment to Section 121 would have provided
this right.The Senator illustrated his disagreement with this pro-
position; "Is the law to be created by Congress and administered
by the States and EPA or is it to be superseded by law created and
enforced by individual litigants and judges throughout the land,
according to their own wide ranging notions of what is 'appropri-
ate' public policy?"1°3
When the 101st Congress finally passed the 1990 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act, the language of Section 121 was left
untouched. This clear rejection of the federal common law of nui-
sance cannot be ignored. Senator Simpson and the Congress con-
templated a situation identical to the issue at hand, and rejected
it outright. The Environmental Protection Agency respectfully
urges this court to follow suit.
101. S. Rep. No. 100-231, at 337 (1987).
102. S. Rep. No. 98-426, at 97 (1984).
103. Id. at 98.
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B. Congress is the appropriate body to deal with an
issue as complex as air pollution control.
The role of the federal judiciary does not include encroach-
ment upon the legislative duties of Congress. In fact the constitu-
tional doctrine of separation of powers mandates this. "Our
"commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental" to
continue to rely on federal common law "by judicially decreeing
what accords with 'common sense and the public weal' " when
Congress has addressed the problem." 10 4 Judicial deference to
Congress is even more crucial when the issues before the court are
of a complex nature. "This deference recognizes that, as an insti-
tution, Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to evalu-
ate the vast amounts of data bearing upon complex issues .... "105
In City of Milwaukee, the Rhenquist court used similar rea-
soning and held that the issue of water pollution was far too com-
plex to be adjudicated and decided upon by the court. "Not only
are the technical problems difficult-doubtless the reason Con-
gress vested authority to administer the Act in administrative
agencies possessing the necessary expertise-but the general area
is particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under a regime
of federal common law."106The Clean Air Act is no less complex
than the Clean Water Act. An attempt to intertwine its provisions
with a federal common law would lead to the "sporadic" and "ad
hoc" enforcement that Congress complained of.10 7
V. THE INDIVISIBLE NATURE OF THE ALLEGED
HARM REQUIRES AN APPLICATION OF THE
LANDERS TEST SO AS TO PROVIDE THE
PLAINTIFFS WITH A POSSIBILITY OF
REDRESS.
The Environmental Protection Agency contends that the link
between the alleged injury and the actions complained of is far too
tenuous to support a claim. However, if this honorable court were
to decide that a public nuisance exists under the federal or state
system, the question of liability and damages must be addressed.
Under the doctrine expounded by the court in the Landers case,
104. City of Milwaukee at 315.
105. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 550 (2001).
106. City of Milwaukee at 325.
107. Id. at 325 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 95 (1971)).
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the power companies of New Union would be held jointly and sev-
erally liable for any damages that Plaintiffs can prove.
Decided in 1952, Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal
Co. addressed the issue of how to apportion liability among multi-
ple tortfeasors who are not acting in concert.108 The Landers case
arose out of a claim by a landowner regarding the pollution of a
lake on his land. 10 9 The landowner claimed that two companies,
who maintained pipe lines adjacent to his land, had negligently
allowed the pipes to leak, thereby killing the fish in his lake and
further causing him damage.110 Both the trial court and the ap-
pellate court found for the defendants based on the rule explained
in Sun Oil Co. V. Robisheaux. 1 ' They held that a lack of concert
of action and unity of design between the defendants precluded
the defendants from being jointly and severally liable for the
plaintiff s injuries. 112 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed in the
name of justice, bolstering their argument by noting that the
Robicheaux rule did not enjoy universal acceptance.'1 3 The rule
which emerged from their analysis was tailored to fit cases, such
as the instant case, in which apportioning out damages with any
measure of accuracy would be impossible. They stated that,
Where the tortuous acts of two or more wrongdoers join to pro-
duce an indivisible injury . .. which from its nature cannot be
apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrong-
doers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally
liable for the entire damages and the injured party may proceed
to judgment against any one separately or against all in one
suit.114
Common law precedent such as the Landers case are disposi-
tive in light of the fact that the Restatement (Third) of Torts takes
no position on "joint and several liability for independent
tortfeasors who do not act intentionally."' 15 An analysis of cases
which dealt with this issue reveals that the approach advocated
by the Village and the Province is a sound one.
108. Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
109. Id. 732.
110. Id.
111. Sun Oil Co. V. Robisheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1930).
112. Landers at 732.
113. Id. at 733, 734.
114. Id. at 734.
115. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment Liab. § .10 cmt. a. (2000).
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The Landers court placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact
that the injury suffered by the plaintiff could not easily be appor-
tioned among the alleged tortfeasors. They criticized the
Robicheaux court for making it nearly impossible for an injured
plaintiff to recover against multiple tortfeasors for an indivisible
harm. 116 The issue in the instant case then becomes whether the
harm suffered by the Province of Inuksuk and the Village of Akuli
is "indivisible" under the Landers Rule. If the injury is indivisible,
practicality and the interests of justice are best served by applying
the Landers rule.
A. The harm suffered by Inuksuk and Akuli is
indivisible in nature.
Before courts will apply a Landers style rule of joint and sev-
eral liability, they must first determine whether the injury is truly
indivisible. The case of Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. Jack-
son11 7 dealt with the alleged contamination of a town's ground-
water supply by defendant oil companies. In light of insufficient
evidence to be able to accurately apportion liability and recogniz-
ing that doing so would be impractical, the court held the harm
was single and indivisible. 118 They went on to state that "where
several persons are guilty of separate and independent acts of
negligence which combine to produce directly a single injury, the
courts will not attempt to apportion the damage, especially where
it is impracticable to do so ..... " 119 The impracticality of attempt-
ing to apportion liability among the New Union power companies
cannot be overstated.
The cause of the harm in the Landers case was a mixture of
salt water and oil flowing into the plaintiffs lake.1 20 The pollu-
tant in the Landers case had a definite source, the leaky pipes,
and the plaintiff had some idea of how much salt water/oil was
leaking onto his land and into his lake.' 21 Even in light of these
relatively straightforward levels of pollution, the court found that
the harm was indivisible. Like the Landers plaintiff, the Village
and Province in the instant case know the amount of pollutants
116. Landers at 734.
117. Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. Jackson 909 P.2d 131, 149 (Okl.App.,1995).
118. Id. at 149.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 732.
121. Id.
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emitted by the New Union power companies. 122 However, unlike
in Landers where the sources of pollution were adjacent to the pol-
luted area, the power companies in this case are a continent
away. 123 Any attempt to break down the proportion of liability
among the Defendant power companies would be futile.
B. The indivisible nature of the alleged harm claimed by
the Plaintiffs calls for the application of the
Landers model of joint and several liability.
The Landers court stated that that the burden of apportioning
the liability among the tortfeasors would be "onerous."124 Such a
burden would deprive the plaintiff of his right to relief. While the
burden of proving the share of liability in Landers would have
been difficult indeed, it cannot approach the burden that would be
imposed on the Village and Province were this court to require
them to apportion the liability of the Defendant utility companies.
If requiring the Landers plaintiff to apportion liability among the
tortfeasors would be "onerous," forcing the Village and Province in
the instant case would be oppressive.
While the issue of whether to saddle multiple tortfeasors with
joint and several liability is hotly contested, the case of Michie v.
Great Lakes Steel Division, Nat. Steel Corp. 125 is instructive. The
plaintiffs in Michie were thirty seven Canadian residents. They
claimed that seven power plants in the United States were dis-
charging pollutants into the air and thus causing a nuisance. Like
the situation with the New Union power plants, the Michie de-
fendants were not acting in concert. The Michie court held that
assuming the plaintiffs could prove liability, "... . if the cumulative
effects of their acts is a single indivisible injury which it cannot
certainly be said would have resulted but for the concurrence of
such acts, the actors are to be held liable as joint tort feasors." 126
Given the indivisible nature of pollutants emitted by the New
Union power plants and alleged to have caused the injury to the
Province and the Village, the above stated rule of joint and several
liability should be applied.
122. Record at 6.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Landers at 735.
125. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, Nat. Steel Corp. 495 F.2d 213 (C.A.Mich.
1974).
126. Id. at 215-16 (quoting Watts v. Smith, 134 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1965), (quoting
Meier v. Holt, 80 N.W.2d 207 (Mich. 1956)).
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C. A failure to apply the Landers rule would effectively
deprive the Plaintiffs of an avenue of redress for
their injuries.
The Province of Inuksuk and the Village of Akuli will have a
difficult time establishing that the carbon dioxide discharged by
the New Union power plants actually caused their injuries they
allege. However, should they prove successful in their pursuit to
show liability, an application of the Landers rule is the only way
that they could hope to recover damages. In effect, the Landers
rule shifted the burden of proof regarding apportionment of dam-
ages from the plaintiffs to the defendants.
The importance of applying Landers in this case is com-
pounded by the fact that an unknown number of entities undoubt-
edly contributed to the injuries complained of. While the New
Union power companies greatly contribute to the amount of car-
bon dioxide in the atmosphere, they are certainly not the only con-
tributors. The Defendant power companies will likely make such
an argument but the Landers court provides for their protection
as well. "If fewer than the whole number of wrongdoers are joined
as defendants to plaintiffs suit, those joined may by proper cross
action under the governing rules bring in those omitted."1 27
Once again, the necessity of applying the Landers rule for
joint and several liability will never be realized unless Inuksuk
and Akuli can meet the burden of proof with regards to liability
and causation. If they do, their injuries are of a nature that at-
tempting to decipher what percentage of the liability the New
Union companies must assume would be a Herculean task. An
application of the Landers rule to the case at hand is paramount
to preserving an avenue for relief for Inuksuk and Akuli as well as
future litigants who tackle this issue.
VI. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE SHOULD
NOT BE A FACTOR IN THE BALANCING
TEST IN NUISANCE ANALYSIS BECAUSE
THE PRINCIPLE DOES NOT APPLY AS A
MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUCH
ANALYSIS IS IRRELEVANT.
The common law tort action of nuisance requires the court to
use a balancing test to weigh the utility of the conduct with the
127. Landers at 734.
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gravity of the harm caused by it.128 Some of the factors to ex-
amine under this test include: (1) extent and type of interference;
(2) its "social value;" (3) the "character of the locality involved;"
and, (4) the burden of avoiding the harm.12 9
The precautionary principle is a tenet of customary interna-
tional law that provides that a "lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea-
sures to prevent environmental degradation.' 30 It places a duty
upon nation States "to take 'remedial action even in the absence of
provable environmental harm, simply on the evidence of signifi-
cant risk thereof.' ' 131 It involves "financial liability for anything
that goes wrong and a duty to monitor, understand, investigate,
inform and act."' 32 Though this principle is espoused as serving
as another limit on a State's ability to permit transboundary pol-
lution, the principle is not well established international law and
lacks a clear definition.133
The issue of whether the precautionary principle should be
considered in the nuisance balancing test is irrelevant to this case
because of the aforementioned reasons that nuisance analysis
does not apply. Even if it did, the precautionary principle is a non-
binding doctrine of customary international law. There are no evi-
dences of this principle being applied by U.S. courts in the context
of transboundary air pollution. This District Court should be af-
firmed in holding not to reach this question.
CONCLUSION
The court below properly granted summary judgment to the
defendants based on the plaintiffs' lack of standing to bring this
issue before the court. The plaintiffs failed to establish a concrete
injury through affidavit and specific evidence as required by law.
128. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 827 cmt. (a) (1979).
129. Id.
130. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, art. 15, 31
I.L.M. 874.
131. Dan Turlock, L. of Water Rights and Resources § 11:8 (quoting Handl, Envi-
ronmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International Law, in Envi-
ronmental Protection and International Law 59, 99 (1991)).
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MEASURING BRIEF
This court should affirm the District Court's holding that the
EPA has no obligation to issue an endangerment finding under
section 115 of the Act, nor could it issue such a finding sua sponte
or without a concurrent reciprocity finding.
The District Court should also be affirmed on the basis that
the United States government, through the EPA, is not affected by
the Trail Smelter case since it is non-binding customary interna-
tional law and does not delineate a requirement of the government
to reduce CO2 emissions through currently available control
technology.
The District Court's holding that the federal common law of
nuisance was preempted by congressional action should be af-
firmed. Congress clearly stated its intent for the preemption of
the federal common law through the legislative history. What
more, the comprehensive nature of the Clean Air Act indicates
Congress' intent to do away with the federal common law of
nuisance.
Were this court to find that a federal common law of nuisance
survived Congress' decisive action, it should apply the Landers
rule. The indivisible nature of the alleged injury and the fact that
any other approach would place an unfair burden on the plaintiffs
strongly support the use of Landers for the instant case.
The District Court was correct in declining to consider the is-
sue regarding the precautionary principle. The principle is inap-
plicable to this case as non-binding evidence of customary
international law and irrelevant since there is no federal common
law of nuisance.
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